Bigger Bombs for a Brighter Tomorrow by John M. Curatola

Author:John M. Curatola
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers
Published: 2016-02-12T00:00:00+00:00

7

Assessments

Even before Vandenberg’s submission of JCS 1952/1, elements within the U.S. military were beginning to doubt the efficacy of atomic strategic bombardment. While the war plans put America’s defensive eggs largely into one atomic basket, would this atomic strategy really work? A critical analysis of the strategic atomic offensive was initiated by General Hubert Harmon of the Air Force at the behest of the JCS in December 1948. A six-member committee, which included two senior officers from each service, began its analysis in January 1949 to evaluate the potential effect of the strategic air offensive. Using the TROJAN war plan as a basis for evaluation, the committee considered the efficacy of the strategic air offensive.

On May 11, 1949, the Harmon committee submitted its unanimous findings to the JCS. Despite TROJAN’s planning shortfalls as discussed previously, and disregarding the Soviet IAD threat to the attacking fleet, the committee assumed that all the planned targets were successfully struck in the aerial assault. The committee considered the aerial offensive occurring in two phases: the initial phase striking the planned 70 targets list with atomic weapons, and a second phase that included both atomic and conventional bombing. In its analysis, the committee found that as a result of the offensive, 30 to 40 percent of Soviet industry would be reduced. However, this effect would be temporary, the net result depending upon Russian recuperative capabilities and the effectiveness of follow-on strikes.1 Especially effective were the attacks on the Soviet petroleum industry, as the committee believed that high-grade fuel, especially for aircraft, would become critical.2

As far as casualties, the aerial offensive might produce as many as 2.7 million deaths along with 4 million additional casualties. In addition, the 70 targeted cities would suffer enormous damage in terms of housing and infrastructure, making life appreciably difficult for another 28 million Soviet citizens.3 In addition to the deaths and physical destruction, the committee also considered psychological damage done to Soviet citizens. While the shock of the attack would be significant, it was not thought that the psychological effects would destroy or critically weaken the communist influence on the masses. As a result the associated effect of the atomic assault would not “per se bring about capitulation.”4 In fact, the committee thought that the opposite effect might be produced by the bombing. The attack would merely reinforce Soviet propaganda messages regarding Western intentions and their nefarious nature. The atomic offensive might have the opposite effect and stiffen Russian resistance to the American onslaught and undermine the overall Allied objectives.5 This thought regarding resistance was well founded, as Air Corps studies in the interwar years found that Chinese, Spanish, and Ethiopian populations became more resilient as a result of air attacks. This same phenomenon occurred in the United Kingdom during “the blitz” in 1940 as Luftwaffe bombers pounded British cities. During the CBO, the USSBS found much of the same evidence regarding German workers’ motivations, with no appreciable change in performance.

However, the committee estimated that the Soviet Union’s ability to

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